






Du Bois, Foucault and Self-Torsion: Criterion of Imprisoned Art
                      
    Figure 1: “Solitary Confinement,” Kennath Artez Henderson (pencil on paper)​[1]​
  
	This essay takes its practical orientation from my experiences as a member of a philosophy reading group on death row at Riverbend Maximum Security Penitentiary in Nashville, Tennessee.​[2]​  Its theoretical orientation comes from W. E. B. Du Bois’ lecture-turned-essay, “Criteria of Negro Art,” which argues that the realm of aesthetics is vitally important in the war against racial discrimination in the United States.​[3]​  And since, according to Michele Alexander’s critically-acclaimed The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, the prison system should be the primary front today in this war, my essay’s ultimate aim is to articulate a new criterion of the present-day “Negro” art being created by a prison population that is still overwhelmingly constituted by persons of color.​[4]​  
In my first section, I will show how Du Bois’ insights in “Criteria of Negro Art” remain relevant today, especially in the prison context, and argue that it is thus appropriate for my new criterion to be shaped by his distinctive conception of “propaganda.”  In my second section, through a close reading of two texts by Michel Foucault (the pivotal thinker of modern imprisonment), I will flesh out this new criterion, “self-torsion,” defined as the effect of prisoners’ attempts at self-care within a prison system that distorts those attempts into further exploitation of both prisoners and the outside world that imprisons them.  And my final section, in an attempt to illustrate this new criterion’s efficacy as a form of propagandistic resistance to contemporary racism, will deploy self-torsion as a critique of two artworks created by imprisoned members of my reading group at Riverbend penitentiary.​[5]​  
Throughout this process, finally, given that the essay (as type) is a literary genre in which essays (as tokens) are themselves artworks, I hope to replicate what I take to be the performative move in Du Bois’ “Criteria of Negro Art,” in which he exemplifies his call to propagandize art by propagandizing the artwork that is his essay.  Put differently, I will offer my own essay as a propagandized (literary) artwork—dedicated to resisting the injustices of modern imprisonment by foregrounding the humanity of the imprisoned—created from within what might be termed, following Foucault, my metaphorical cell in our Panopticon-transfigured world.


I.	Du Bois’ “Criteria of [Death Row] Art”
	“Criteria of Negro Art,” originally a lecture delivered to the annual conference of the NAACP, was later published in essay form in a 1926 issue of its official magazine, The Crisis.  Although almost a century old, therefore, the lecture’s opening line is nevertheless not even slightly dated.  “I do not doubt,” Du Bois begins, “but that there are some in this audience who are thinking something like” the following: “how is it that an organization of this kind can turn aside to talk about art?” (993)  Du Bois’ response is that art is not only “part of the great fight we are carrying on,” but even “represents a forward and an upward look—a pushing onward” (993).  That this fight for social justice still continues today is made clear by the very existence of the present anthology.  
	Du Bois then raises the question, as germane today as his opening point, as to whether the black community wants nothing more than “to be Americans,” since, he claims, those “who are dark can see America in a way that white Americans can not,” leaving these darker-skinned folks not “satisfied with [U.S. America’s] present goals and ideals” (993).  Imprisoned Americans, too, I quickly learned in our reading group at Riverbend, are similarly (a) vision-gifted, (b) dissatisfied with the world beyond the prison, and (c) disproportionately darker-skinned (compared to the outside population).  As early as the first meeting of that group, for example, I was struck (along with the other “outsiders,” as we were called) by how the “insiders” (that is, prisoners) were both comparatively more insightful than your average layperson regarding social issues, and also focused (almost to the point of obsession) with politics in general and social justice in particular, and how this was especially true of the prisoners of color in the group.  
Like the African-Americans of Du Bois’ era, these prisoners of color have apparently, as Du Bois puts it, acquired “a distaste for the tawdry and the flamboyant,” and “a vision of what the world could be if it were really a beautiful world,” namely one “where men know, where men create, where they realize themselves and where they enjoy life” (994, 995).  More specifically on this point, the prisoner of color’s favorite focus, which they emphasized repeatedly, was education for at-risk youth, and explicitly because of these prisoners’ belief that this is the most effective site for directing what we in the group began (spontaneously) to call “transformative” political action.
	The third moment in Du Bois’ lecture is an exploration of the concept, long central to aesthetics, of beauty.  Although he claims that beauty’s “variety is infinite” and “its possibilities” “endless,” and that the “world is full of it,” Du Bois notes, nevertheless, that “today the mass of human beings are choked away from it, and their lives distorted and made ugly” (995).  One would be hard pressed to find a more apt description of the prison system today, where it also still rings true that, as Du Bois asserts, this denial of beauty has a particular edge for black folks, who “have as a race new stirrings…of a desire to create” (995).
	At this point in my essay, the reader might be wondering the same thing that Du Bois infers that his own audience is wondering at this point in his lecture, namely, what “has this Beauty to do with the world,” or with “Truth and Goodness”?  Demurring that he is “but an humble discipline of art, and cannot presume to say,” Du Bois testifies that “here and now in this world in which I work they are for me unseparated and inseparable” (995).  In other words, this connection between beauty and world/truth/goodness for Du Bois is forged, not from aesthetic arguments, but from his own lived experiences.  My own experiences, similarly, with the imprisoned artists in our group at Riverbend, have convinced me that for these artists, too, art is inseparable from their excruciatingly-constricted “worlds,” the “truths” of their imprisoned situation, and the political “goodness” for which their work strives.
  	Even if my reader were to concede this point, however, s/he might still wonder whether prisoners’ art in general is bound to be—to put it simply, bad—at least in comparison to the best art created outside prison.  And since, to repeat, it remains true today that most prisoners are people of color, this inferred question overlaps to a certain degree with the next one that Du Bois infers on behalf of his own audience: “Of what is the colored artist capable?” (997)  The most common answer, today as a century ago, remains that such art “is inferior because it is done by colored people” (although today one would use the code of “urban” or “prison”) (997).
On a more optimistic note, the “growing realization” of Du Bois’ day (among “both” white and black folks) is still growing today, namely “that the work of the black man is not always inferior,” and, analogously, the work of the imprisoned art is not always inferior, either (997).  In support of this point, Du Bois mentions specific examples of African-American artists, including the poets Countée Cullen and Langston Hughes, and contemporary examples of imprisoned artists include Lee Evans and Alfred Santos.​[6]​  Du Bois cautions, however, that this “recognition accorded to Cullen,” Hughes, and others artists of color does not amount to “the real solution to the color problem,” nor does it mean for Du Bois that the sole remaining necessary and sufficient condition for people of color to social justice is to work to be successful in the artworld (997).  As counterexamples to this position, Du Bois relates stories from black artists of his day, including Richard Brown, who, if “he had been white, would be alive today instead of dead of neglect” (998).  Contemporary counterexamples of imprisoned artists, similarly, which are as numerous as their cultural invisibility is pervasive, include the two artists whose work brackets the present essay, Kennath Artez Henderson and David Duncan.
	Having cautioned the reader against a simplistic position from one of the spectrum, Du Bois then, as is his way, rejects an equally simplistic position from the other end, in this case quietism in the face of tremendous anti-black racism.  In brief, he insists that black art, though not the sole necessary condition for racial justice, nevertheless remains one necessary condition.  “Thus,” Du Bois concludes, “it is the bounden duty of black America to begin this great work of the creation of Beauty, of the preservation of Beauty, of the realization of Beauty, and we must use in this work all the methods that men have used before” (1000).  Today, similarly, I would argue that there is a correlative duty for (a) imprisoned America to continue this “creation” of beauty, and for (b) we outsiders to assist in the “preservation” of this beauty, all in order to (c) foster an increasing “realization” of beauty in our society—all in order to end the ugly, racially-discriminatory practices of contemporary imprisonment.  
But how, the objection will go, could such a grand design ever be realized?  Du Bois’ old answer to this question, still actionable today, is that we simply need to apply what he calls our foremost “methods,” the “tools” of “Truth” and “goodness” (1000).  And in the next sentence he asserts the essay’s famous and controversial thesis: “Thus all art is propaganda and ever must be,” specifically for “gaining the right of black folks to love and enjoy,” because without such advocacy, “propaganda is confined to one [white] side while the other is stripped and silent” (1000).  More specifically, Du Bois explains, “the white public today demands from its artists, literary and pictorial, racial pre-judgment which deliberately distorts Truth and Justice, as far as colored races are concerned, and it will pay for no other”; while “on the other hand, the young and slowly growing black public still wants its prophets almost equally unfree,” for example insofar as it is “ashamed of sex,” with a religion that “holds [it] in superstition.”  Today too, on the one hand, a vast majority of the art produced is capitalistic propaganda for multi-national corporations; and on the other, filmmakers such as Tyler Perry who endorse fundamentalist Christian values enjoy tremendous success, while artistically and politically more sophisticated filmmakers such as Spike Lee languish in stigmatized marginalization.
At the end of the day, though, Du Bois concludes, the black community “can afford the truth.  White folk today cannot” (1001).  By the same token, today’s prisoners, too—as is apparent to me from my experiences at Riverbend—can afford the truth, while most of us on the outside—as is obvious from the average (white) college student’s limited knowledge of the prison system—cannot.  Consequently, those of us who have been made aware of these conditions “must,” as Du Bois challenges the black folks of his time, “build [ourselves] up into that catholicity of temper which is going to enable the artist to have his widest degree of freedom” (1001).  Today, we too, “must come to the place where the work of art when it appears is reviewed and acclaimed by our own free and unfettered judgment” (1001).  The “point today,” Du Bois writes, “is that until the art of the black folk compels recognition they will not be rated as human,” and the point today is that neither will contemporary prisoners be rated as human until their art, too compels recognition (1002).  
But how, one might ask, can this more focused goal, and in regard to imprisoned art today, be accomplished?  How can we sound the call to propagandize imprisoned art, as Du Bois a century ago sounded the call to propagandize “Negro” art?  As usual, Du Bois already points us in the right direction, in that what we need, for imprisoned art, is something analogous to what he provides in this lecture for Negro art, namely a new “criterion.”  And since this word, already doing so much work in Du Bois’ text, will be similarly important in mine, I will now consider it in detail.
According to the OED, the three meanings of “criterion” are (a) “an organ of judging,” (b) a “test” for use in said judgment, and (c) the “distinguishing mark” by which the result of said judgment are registered.  Etymologically, similarly, “criterion” is a direct cognate from the Greek κριτήριον, which has the exact same definition; in this way, the etymology is linked to definition (b).  Moreover, the noun κριτήριον is itself derived from another noun, κριτής, which means “judge”; in this way, the etymology is linked to definition (a).  Regarding historical usage, finally, the OED points out that in the seventeenth century the word was written in the original Greek (that is, Cyrillic) script; in this way, the etymology is linked to definition (c).  
In other words, both criterion’s definitions and its etymology agree that it is, in some way, a combination of (a) that which judges, (b) that which the judging power utilizes in order to judge, and (c) that which marks something as having been judged.  To translate this triadic structure into a strategy for my own new criterion, “self-torsion” will need to be not only (a) a function or power that can judge/evaluate the art of the imprisoned, but also (b) a kind of test whereby that power’s judgment can be enacted, as well as (c) something that will mark each artwork that passes under the test of that judge.
One could also use these three criteria of “criteria,” moreover, to evaluate Du Bois’ “Criteria” as not only about “Negro” art, but also itself an example of a piece of literary “Negro” art.  That this is a legitimate move is supported by the fact that he clearly intends literary artworks in general to be covered under the category of “Art” in the title, since (as I noted above) two of his examples of black artists are poets.  In regard to the first, “judging power” sense, the essay is explicitly offering itself as a standard by which to judge and evaluate African-American art, and has certainly been a controversial and powerful force for that since its publication.  In regard to the second, “test” sense, its thesis of propagandizing has become an important standard by which to evaluate artists’ commitment to the kinds of social justice to which Du Bois dedicated his long life.  And in regard to the third, “distinguishing mark” sense, to return to this issue of controversy, both the reception of Du Bois’ essay and also Du Bois himself as an artist have been marked by the same mixture of stigmatized marginalization and a growing realization of his full humanity (and thereby of black folks in general) that attended the artworks and careers of the black artists (such as Richard Brown) whose stories Du Bois relates within the essay.  And on this note, I wish to implore the reader’s assistance, ultimately, in attempting to evaluate both my own new criterion, and also my own essay as a metaphorically imprisoned artwork.  But for now I turn, in the following section, to Foucault’s writings to find and flesh out “self-torsion.”

II.	Discipline and Punish, The Hermeneutics of the [Imprisoned] Subject
In regard to imprisonment, I will consider Foucault’s most famous “genealogical” study of the prison system, translated into English as Discipline and Punish.  And in regard to what he terms the “care of the self,” I will consider his 1981-1982 College de France lectures, recently translated into English as Hermeneutics of the Subject.​[7]​  More specifically, I will show how modern imprisonment and Hellenistic/Roman self-care as Foucault conceptualizes them are surprisingly analogous.  Consequently, it was no great leap, when the prisons began to facilitate prisoners’ pursuit of self-care within the very walls of the prison.  In fact, one could even go further, and argue that facilitation was the logical conclusion of modern imprisonment, as supported by the prisoners’ self-care tending to gravitate around meditating on the Stoics, to whom Foucault ascribes the pinnacle of self-care. 
The overall effect of this incorporation of self-care within the prisons, finally, is an even more profound manipulation of both the prisoners and the outside world that imprisons them, including a considerable amount of free publicity for the prisons themselves.  Riverbend, for example, despite its all-too-common and pervasive mistreatment of its prisoners, is actually world-famous for its “progressive” and “experimental” methods (including, for example, our reading group itself), making it a major destination for prison experts from around the world, who travel to Riverbend to study these methods and then return home to apply those methods to prisons in their home nations.
Before launching into my reading of select passages from Discipline and Punish, I will first consider the Greek phrase from which the English “care of the self” derives, epimeleisthai heautou, as explored in Hermeneutics of the Subject.  Etymologically, Foucault explains, the phrase epimeleisthai heautou is linked to the Greek verb meletan, meaning “to practice and train,” which, in turn, is linked to the verb gumnazein (as in “gymnastics”).  These “meletai,” Foucault continues, “are exercises, gymnastic and military exercises, military training”; and, with the prefix “epi-“ added, become “a form of vigilant, continuous, applied, regular, etcetera, activity” (84).  This resonance with the gymnastics-type exercises that make up the bulk of many prisoners’ daily lives is, moreover, intensified by the subsequent details of Foucault’s analysis.  
These meletai, Foucault elaborates, were part of an entire “vocabulary” that referred to “withdrawing into the self, retiring into the self, or again, descending to the depths of oneself,” “gathering oneself around oneself,” and “collecting oneself in the self, or again in establishing oneself in the self as in a place of refuge, a well-fortified citadel, a fortress protected by walls, etcetera,” all of which are phrases that reappear throughout the literature of prison memoirs, straight from the fortresses of the literal Panopticon.​[8]​  In addition to this general vocabulary, moreover, Foucault also identifies “a medical vocabulary” variation of this general vocabulary, according to which one should “treat oneself, cure oneself, conduct amputations on oneself,” as well as a “legal” variation, according to which one must (to quote Seneca) “lay claim to yourself” and “emancipate oneself” (85).  For the reader familiar with Foucault’s work, the parallels here with his analyses of the prison and the clinic are striking. 
Along these lines, I also want to briefly consider four moments from Foucault’s book, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Care of the Self (which draws extensively on the lectures that make up the Hermeneutics of the Subject) that also resonate with his analyses in Discipline and Punish.  First, in Part Two, Foucault notes that Hellenistic/Roman self-care “concerned only the social groups, limited in number, that were bearers of culture” (45).  In other words, this golden age was constituted exclusively by a small minority of the total population, which is obviously also true of the prison artists in the U.S. prison system.  
In the second moment, Foucault singles out the Stoic philosopher Epictetus as the philosopher in whom “one finds the highest philosophical development of this theme” of self-care, namely Epictetus’ definition of “man” as “the being who was destined to care for himself” (45, 47).  Epictetus, of course, spent his live as a Roman slave and was thus, like today’s prison-artists, caught up in a kind of imprisonment (albeit one not contained in a prison cell).  Perhaps in connection to his own slavery, Epictetus also conceived self-care, according to Foucault, as “a privilege-duty, a gift-obligation,” in the hyphenating-bonding of which phrases I see a foreshadowing of my concept of self-torsion (47).  
Relatedly, in the third moment, Foucault observes that the Greek word translated by the English “care,” epimeleia, “is employed in speaking of the activities of the master of a household, the tasks of the ruler who looks after his subjects,” and “with regard to oneself as well,” the word “implies a labor” (50).  Thus, when a prisoner attempts to engage in self-care, this amounts to engaging in an activity linked to the mastery of a homeowner/slaveholder and political ruler, and with the crucial difference that this activity is directed exclusively on her/himself.  In a sense, therefore, this self-focus, redoubles the effect of the existing mastery already being enacted against the prisoner by her/his various masters.  And in this redoubling structure, one can see an analogy to the way in which Panopticon according to Foucault redoubles the work of disciplining by offloading that work onto the “soul” of the prisoner.
Fourth and finally from The Care of the Self, Foucault’s subsequent description of the details of Hellenistic/Roman self-care could have been quoted directly from a technical prison manual.  “The time is not empty; it is filled with exercises, practical tasks, various activities…There are also the talks that one has with a confidant, with friends, with a guide or director.  Add to this the correspondence in which one reveals the state of one’s soul” (51).  Consequently, prison life for Foucault “constituted, not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice,” “often took form within more or less institutionalized structures,” and was thus, like Hellenistic/Roman self-care “in close correlation with medical thought and practice” (51, 54).
	These same issues from The Care of the Self will recur, albeit in a modified and more detailed form, in the moments from Hermeneutics of the Subject to which I will draw the reader’s attention as I now begin to work through Discipline and Punish.  In Part 1, Chapter 1 of the latter, Foucault’s central concern, immediately following his discussions of “a public execution” and prison “timetable,” is “the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle,” the most important being that the “body as the major target of penal repression disappeared” (7, 8).  In other words, as the West moved away from public torture of the punished person’s body, society swung, not to a private torture of that body, but toward a new ideal according to which one “no longer touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then only to reach something other than the body itself” (11).  As a result, Foucault writes, “a new army of technicians” were unleashed, who “took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists” (11).  As early as page eleven, therefore, one can already see the first of many resonances with Foucault’s analyses from Hermeneutics of the Subject, insofar as Foucault includes education, medical, and psychological professionalism among the roles of the “master” in Hellenistic/Roman self-care (HS 130).
Despite this shift away from the body, however, Foucault allows that “imprisonment has always, involved a certain degree of physical pain” (DP 16).  This is also true, for him, of the “exercises of abstinence” in Hellenistic/Roman self-care, which involved denying oneself sex, food, water, clothing and shelter (HS 430).  “There remains, therefore, a trace of ‘torture’ in the modern mechanisms of criminal justice,” Foucault explains, the novelty of which is that it now “lays hold” on “the soul” (instead of the body) (DP 16).  Foucault describes this soul-torture as “the end of a certain kind of tragedy; comedy began, with shadow play, faceless voices, impalpable entities (DP 16).  Similarly, Foucault remarks, in Hermeneutics of the Subject, on the comedic quality of Lucian’s satires on philosophical self-care, and on the “impalpable entity” of the voice of Frondo, Marcus Aurelius’ spiritual master, in Aurelius’ head as revealed by his personal letter to Frondo (HS 92, 159-162).  
Additionally on this latter point, just as Aurelius in this letter (a) judges his own foibles, and (b) notes the deleterious effects on himself of environmental factors, so too modern judges have (a) “taken to judging…the ‘soul’ of the criminal,” specifically (b) on “the passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity” (DP 19, 17).  And the questions of these modern judges, like those of Aurelius, involve whether a given act is “a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a delusional episode, a perverse action,” as in the now-famous insanity plea (19).  Finally on this note, just as, in modern punishment, “every crime and even every offence now carries within it, as a legitimate suspicion, but also as a right that may be claimed, the hypothesis of insanity, in any case of anomaly,” in Hellenistic/Roman self-care too, the subject was understood as always-already flawed and diseased (HS 129, DP 20).
	In summarizing this first chapter of the first part of Discipline and Punish, Foucault characterizes his book as a whole as “a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge,” which entails that the self—which is, by definition at the core of Hellenistic/Roman self-care—is also at the core of his study of imprisonment (23).  This shared focus on the self produces two more significant parallels, at the broadest level, between Foucault’s conceptions of imprisonment and self-care.  First, rules one and two of Foucault’s four “general rules” for his prison study can also be found in his work on self-care, namely (1) “regard punishment as a complex social function” and (2) regard “punishment as a political tactic” (23).  In fact, most of the roughly 500 pages of The entirety of Hermeneutics of the Subject are devoted to the endless complexities of self-care, and the ultimate payoff for Foucault (from Platonic self-care in Alcibiades to Aurelius as emperor) is a way “that we should be able to connect together the question of politics and the question of ethics” (252).  And second, Foucault writes that he intends Discipline and Punish to show how “power produces knowledge,” and how the two “directly imply one another,” which is reminiscent of how the power of the master catalyzes the subject’s self-transformation in Hellenistic/Roman self-care, specifically in the “free speech” (in ancient Greek, parrhesia) that the master is ethically and politically obligated to provide to the subject (DP 27, HS 379).  
Foucault would likely respond to my suggestion by reiterating that the modern soul is essentially different from the self of Hellenistic/Roman self-care.  The modern soul is unique, he observes in Discipline and Punish, in that it “is born rather out of methods of punishment” and is therefore “the effect and instrument of a political anatomy” and “the prison of the body” (29, 30).  It remains an open question, however, as to what happens when this new torture—this creation of the (soul-) prison for of the (prisoner’s) body—incorporates, as a core aspect, a new version of Hellenistic/Roman self-care.  
One possible answer can be found in the subsequent paragraph of Discipline and Punish, wherein Foucault describes “revolts against modern prisons” as revolts “at the level of the body, against the very body of the prison” (30).  The most important aspect of this quote, for my purposes, is its introduction of what might be termed a second instance of doubling.  That is, the soul, already defined by Foucault as (a) the manufactured prison of the body, (b) creates, through these revolts (qua self-care), a new, as it were, sub-prison within the prison of the soul, and (c) this new prison-within-a-prison is located specifically in the physical “body” of the prison itself.​[9]​
In addition to these accounts of modern imprisonment in general, Foucault’s analyses of prison reform in particular (in Part 2, Chapter 1) also resonate with his accounts of Hellenistic/Roman self-care.  First, Foucault claims that the “true objective of the reform movement” was “to set up a new ‘economy’ of the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, so that it should be neither too concentrated at certain privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities” all the way “down to the finest grain of the social body”; and all of this is reminiscent of the self-transformative objectives in Hellenistic/Roman self-care (DP 80, HS 11).
Secondly in regard to prison reform, Foucault’s claim that the new penal system was “a mechanism intended to administer illegalities differently, not to eliminate them all,” also resonates with Hellenistic/Roman self-care, since the latter too, according to Foucault trained the subject to process and experience misfortune differently, rather than attempting to remove that misfortune altogether (DP 89, HS184).  A similar parallel can be seen in the prison reformers’ idea that the “least crime attacks the whole of society,” as a consequence of which, “the offender” becomes understood as “worse than an enemy, for it is from within society that he delivers his blows – he is nothing less than a traitor, a ‘monster’” (DP 90).  The concept of vice for Hellenistic/Roman self-care is also construed, ultimately, as an internal problem, in the specific form of a vicious cycle of inaccurate perceptions which leads to the subject’s continuous psychological and political bondage (HS 131).
Building on this point, since the modern criminal becomes an ever-present part of society, modern punishment ended up becoming severe, which amounted for Foucault to the first severe punishment since the era of public torture.  And Hellenistic/Roman self-care views the passions as similarly omnipresent, and introduced similarly severe forms of discipline, including imagining one’s children dying whenever one kissed them, and denying oneself food, clothing and sex (DP 90, HS 433, 431).  This severity in criminal punishment, in turn, inspired renewed calls for “humane” moderation, the carrying-out of which required a new principle of calculation, that is, a way to mathematize the effects of punishment based on “the injury that a crime inflicts upon the social body” (91, 92).  Such “injury” was understood as “the disorder that [crime] introduces into” the social body, that is, the effects whereby crimes inspire crime’s “repetition” (92).  Thus, Foucault explains, the reformers’ new punishment was (a) “an art of effects,” whose “point of application” was (b) the production of “a play of representations” in “the minds of all” (DP 92, 101).  Analogously, Foucault describes Hellenistic/Roman self-care as (a) a kind of art, namely “an art of living,” central to which is (b) “flux” and “steam of representations” (HS 294, 473).
Foucault develops this connection between punishment and art/aesthetics at greater length in Part 2, Chapter 2, and in four additional respects.  First, he describes the “art of punishing” as “a sort of reasonable aesthetic of punishment,” which calls to mind the beautiful-because-rational Hellenistic/Roman art of living (DP 104, 106).  Second, Foucault explains how modern punishment’s “complex of signs” functions to “reduce the desire that makes the crime attractive; increase the interest that makes the penalty be feared” (DP 106).  Hellenistic/Roman self-care’s rigorous practices were also intended to overcome the short-sighted desires that make the vicious act seem attractive, and attempted to increase the interest that make undisciplined openness to all representations into something to be feared.  Third, since the prison reformers insisted that “everyone must see punishment not only as natural, but in his own self-interest,” they thus felt that “punishments must be a school rather than a festival; an ever open-book rather than a ceremony” (111).  This latter point is reminiscent of, on the one hand, the Stoics’ school, located on their famous painted porch (stoa being the Greek for “porch”), and on the other hand, the book-length collected letters and treatises of philosophers such as Seneca.  And finally on this prison/art connection Foucault writes that reformers would have us “conceive of places of punishment as a Garden of the Laws,” which calls to mind the Garden of Epicurus, the famous locale of the Epicurean school of Hellenistic philosophy (111).
The details of these schools of punishment also show interesting correlations with Hellenistic/Roman self-care.  For one thing, “the English model” of the new prisons, Foucault observes, “added, as an essential addition to correction, isolation,” and thus reintroduced the “cell, that technique of Christian monasticism,” which he repeatedly links in Hermeneutics of the Subject to self-care (HS 116).  For another, in “the Philadelphia model” (as contrasted with the English model), the prisoner’s life, Foucault writes, “was partitioned” based on “an absolutely strict time-table, under constant supervision” (124).  And the prison, he concludes, “functions in this as apparatus of knowledge,” specifically through “studied manipulation of the individual,” and apparatuses [dispositifs] for what a kind of self-manipulation are also critical, for Foucault, in Hellenistic/Roman self-care (DP 126, HS 319).  
To recap the insights from my readings of Foucault, I have tried to show a number of significant similarities between modern imprisonment and Hellenistic/Roman self-care as he conceptualizes these two phenomena.  Although there are also, of course, many important differences between the two, these similarities suggest that it was not too much of a stretch for modern imprisonment to implement in its own practices, intentionally or unintentionally, aspects of Hellenistic/Roman self-care.​[10]​  To try to get at what this would look like, I will now consider several important images/metaphors/figures at work in these texts.
Foucault’s primary figure for the mechanisms of individuation under disciplinary power, in both the prisons and also the world in which they exist, is, of course, Bentham’s plan for the ideal Utilitarian prison, “The Panopticon.”  And I would argue that this figure of the Panopticon can be productively linked to a favorite figure in the Stoics for the person lacking mastery in self-care, namely a “spinning top” (HS 207).  The properties of the top by which it is distanced from self-care, Foucault explains, are that it is (a) moved by an external force, (b) constantly presents different aspects of itself to different parts of its environment, and (c) appears motionless while in constant motion (207).  In proper self-care, by contrast, the subject is supposed to achieve a state, with (a) no outside help, that (b) applies in all circumstances, of (c) actual stillness—as captured in the Stoic metaphor of a vessel returning safely, after a long and circular journey, to its “homeport” (as in the Odyssey) (248).  
Focusing on these three aspects of the top and the vessel, the prisoners’ attempts at self-care align more closely with former, and for the following three reasons: (a) every such attempt by a prisoner is facilitated—and often even encouraged as part of rehabilitation—by the external force of the prison; (b) imprisoned self-care is, qua imprisoned, by definition limited to the duration of a prisoner’s time behind bars; and (c) for the length of said imprisonment, the process of imprisoned self-care is never-ending (and literally so in the case of life sentences and capital punishment).  Although this might suggest that the locus of the prison simply, and singlehandedly, transforms the practice of self-care into something more like its polar opposite, on further reflection things are (as usual) more complicated.  
To get a more precise sense of what might make imprisoned self-care distinct from (what one might call) self-carelessness, I now ask the reader’s indulgence in the following thought experiment.  First, picture a top that is constructed of a flexible material such as rubber (rather than the kind of material normally used for making tops, such as perhaps hard plastic or wood).  Now, imagine that the base of this more flexible top is firmly affixed to a concrete floor, like that of a prison cell in the Panopticon, but that someone is nevertheless still trying as hard as s/he can to spin the top.  After a moment’s reflection, the reader will realize that the result of such an attempt would be that the top would begin to coil, narrowing in on itself ever more tightly, into a highly tensed, and ever more distorted shape, ultimately resembling that of a common screw.​[11]​  
The activity whereby this screw is produced, finally, is what I have termed “self-torsion.”  According to the OED, the meanings of “torsion” include (a) “the action of twisting, or turning a body spirally by the operation of contrary forces acting at right angles to its axis”; (b) “a twisting of the body or a part of it; contortion, distortion”; and its earliest meaning, (c) “a wringing or griping of the bowels.”  And torsion’s etymology is from the Latin “torquēre, tortum to twist, wring,” and thus linked to the English “torso.”​[12]​  More precisely, a screw is a tool whose twisted shape makes it extremely useful for the binding together of heterogeneous surfaces and objects in the specific world in which it is mass-produced. 
This also suggests, through a bit of Du Boisian propaganda-sanctioned wordplay, that the process that leads to this result is a kind of “being screwed,” an expression in idiomatic English synonymous with exploitative injustice (as in the sentence: “He got screwed by the company”).  Put differently, at the level of social justice, the imprisoned artist qua screwed-by-self-torsion-into-a-screw could symbolize the way that disciplinary power and bio-power fuse heterogeneous elements of an unjust society into exploitative order.  
For example, while many of the imprisoned artists in our reading group at Riverbend have read widely in philosophy on their own initiative, these efforts have nevertheless been coopted by Riverbend to market itself worldwide as a model of progressive rehabilitation (as I noted above), while these same imprisoned artists are among those regularly mistreated by Riverbend.  In one case, before our group began, one of our group members had been left alone in his cell for two weeks without medical assistance after a severe seizure.  In another, during the time that our group was meeting, another member was punished with solitary confinement, without explanation, after collecting extra toilet paper rolls to make his miniature furniture for a local art exhibition, even though there was no rule against this, and no warning.
It is stories like these that have inspired my call for to propagandize imprisoned art, following the lead of Du Bois by suggesting a new criterion guided by the aforementioned three definitional/etymological criteria of the word “criteria.”  In regard to the first of these, self-torsion is (a) the “organ” or power for evaluating imprisoned art insofar as it is the cause, both psychologically and politically, of that art.  In regard to the second criterion, self-torsion is (b) a “test” for whether an artwork counts as imprisoned art in that a given artwork can be meaningfully understood as an imprisoned artwork to the degree that self-torsion constitutes an effective tool with which to makes sense of, and evaluate, that artwork (which ultimately suggest that, to a lesser degree, all art created in our Panopticon-transfigured world is at least somewhat, metaphorically “imprisoned”).  And in regard to the third criterion, self-torsion is also (c) the “distinguishing mark” of imprisoned art in that it will bear witness, a fairly direct, immediate and surface-level way, to its having been created under the dual oppressive regimes of disciplinary power and bio-power.
To illustrate the capacity of the concept and figure of self-torsion to resisting these forms of oppression, I will now, in my final section, utilize self-torsion as a lens through which to explore—and to “propagandize” in Du Bois’ sense—two artworks created by imprisoned artists in our reading group on death row at Riverbend.

III.	Conclusion: Self-Torsion in Imprisoned Art
I begin with the drawing that that appears at the beginning of my essay (Figure 1), Kennath Henderson’s “Solitary Confinement.”  Note, first, the twisted and contorted comportment of the figure, which is, moreover, repeated and intensified in the most complex and detailed section of the drawing, namely the prisoner’s heavily-veined hand.  Note also that the boundaries between the figure and the background are blurred, both by (a) the lines of the bricks intruding into the figure, and also (b) by the ethereal semi-translucence of the entire figure.  Despite this latter effect, however, the figure in the drawing is nevertheless connected, by its lighter shade of gray, to both the light through the window’s bars and also the patch of light on the bench next to the figure.  
Self-torsion, it appears to me, would suggest that if one attempts to hold these two elements (the blurring and the connectedness) together, one can thereby see the humanity of the figure—and thus also the humanity of the prisoner who drew that figure—in the way that the figure is both capable of being distorted by, and yet also visually separable from, its monotonous background.  Put differently, self-torsion, although it foregrounds the torsion, also, thereby, simultaneously implies the self, specifically as the only “material” that could endure so much torsion and still retain any structural integrity whatsoever, as in the aforementioned figure of the rubber top nailed to the prison floor and spun into a screw.
My second and final artwork is David Duncan’s painting, on a plain white sheet, entitled “Do I Compel You?” (Figure 2)  Note first, here, that the figure in this painting has no visible face (as is also the case with the figure in Henderson’s “Solitary Confinement”).  Second, given that the artist is a devout Christian (like many of the prisoners in our group), the red dots on the hands and head and the red arrow pointing to the figure’s side suggest that the stigmata of a crucified Jesus.  And if one assumes that this figure is indeed Jesus, one might further speculate that he is also the speaker of the painting’s titular question, regarding compulsion.  Altogether, then, one might conclude that, if any kind of self-care was involved in the creation of this work, it would have to be the kind that Foucault describes as specifically “Christian.”
Another possibility, however, as to the identity of the figure in this painting is that it is a prisoner, and perhaps even the prisoner that is the artist himself.  If so, then the question would arguably shift, from a straightforward call for religious conversion toward a more indirect call for political transformation.  The latter could perhaps be expressed in the following question: “As a figure representing the prisoner, who in turn represents the prisoner who painted this figure, do I compel you to acknowledge my humanity, and thus also, perhaps, the humanity of imprisoned artists or even the imprisoned in general?”  
One justification for thinking of this figure as the artist himself can be found in the predominance, in the art of our group members at Riverbend, of self-portraits (most often in the form of a prisoner sitting alone in a cell, as in Henderson’s “Solitary Confinement).  A second justification for interpreting this figure as the artist is that the choice of colors in the painting is unusual, specifically in Duncan’s use of yellow for the sky behind the cross.  Not only is this relatively rare in paintings of the crucifixion, but when it does occur, the yellow is usually either near the horizon (to suggest the impending darkness caused by Jesus’ death), or else takes the form of lightning (presumably connected to the thunder in the Gospel’s account of the moment of Jesus’ death).  In Duncan’s painting, however, the yellow dominates the top, rather than the bottom, half of the background, specifically from the figure’s waist upward.  Additionally, this yellow is contrasted with a predominance of green in the painting’s bottom half; and this is, as far as I am aware, unique in the history of major depictions of the crucifixion).  
Self-torsion, it appears to me, would suggest that the yellow could be—in a gesture of Du Boisian “propaganda”—interpreted as an indicator of intense heat, perhaps specifically the heat that might be generated by the friction of a screw being driven rapidly into a surface.  And if so, the rippling edges along the figure’s torso—remembering the “torsion”/“torso” connection—could be interpreted as the thread of the screw (as viewed, at eye level, from the side).​[13]​  Perhaps, in other words, this figure could be meaningfully understood as the imprisoned artist being, as it were, screwed upwards (since the yellow, to repeat, occupies the top half of the painting).  And perhaps, remembering the third sense of “criterion,” the compulsion that animates this imprisoned artist, and thus also his painting, is actually the question etched onto the figure.  
Insofar as my propagandistic, self-torsional interpretation is meaningful, therefore, the question that forms the title of this painting could also be understood as directed, in an ironic way, to the prison itself and its Panopticon-transfigured world.  In other words, I would suggest that, with critical support, the self beneath the torsion shines, briefly, through this artwork.  In other words, I am suggesting that Hellenistic/Roman self-care, imprisoned, nevertheless makes a brief gesture through its bars to the prison whose practice it torsion.  In this way, the screw, screwed by its own self-torsion, is here “screwing up” its courage to manifest its own noble resistance to that self-torsion.  In closing, having reiterated above several of Du Bois’ questions from his artwork on Negro art, I now reiterate to my reader—in a gesture imploring the reader’s evaluation of this essay as metaphorically-imprisoned propaganda—Duncan’s painting’s titular question—and on behalf of the literally imprisoned: “Do I compel you?”
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